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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the impact of the Golden Dawn on the dynamics 
of domestic party competition by examining whether there has been a 
change in issue salience since the party’s dramatic rise. Our main goal is 
to examine the salience of topics in the Golden Dawn’s agenda from a 
comparative perspective vis-à-vis the other actors in the system, in order 
to identify whether attention on particular issues has shifted. We 
proceed with an analysis of programmatic and ideological materials 
produced by the Golden Dawn and its competitor parties, including 
election manifestos and public speeches. We analyse these documents 
through the employment of a comprehensive framework for coding 
policy agendas provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). We 
find no direct effect on the salience of the immigration issue. However, 
there is a rise of nationalism across the party system. 
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Changing the policy agenda? The impact of 
the Golden Dawn on Greek party politics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The success of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn has been frequently linked to 
Greece’s severe economic crisis. In May and June 2012, in the first 
national electoral contests that took place in Greece after the eruption 
of the crisis, the Golden Dawn gained 7.0 and 6.9% of the vote 
respectively, marking a dramatic rise. Despite the extremity of its 
ideology and its use of violence, the party sustained its support in 
subsequent elections. In the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) 
elections, it came third with 9.4% of the vote. In the two 2015 national 
elections of January and September it received 6.3% and 7.0% 
respectively. The rise of the Golden Dawn is important both within the 
context of Greece specifically, where the economic crisis has contributed 
to the rise of extremism and anti-establishment politics and the 
implosion of the party system; but also as part of the broader 
phenomenon of the upsurge of far-right parties across Europe as a result 
of the economic crisis (Bosco and Verney 2012; Halikiopoulou and 
Vlandas 2015).  
Reflecting on the party’s electoral breakthrough and its relevance within 
the broader context of increasing far-right party support, existing work 
has focused on the party’s rise within the context of economic crisis 
(Ellinas 2013; 2015; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015; Halikiopoulou 
and Vasilopoulou 2016), its discourse (Kyriazi 2016), its organisational 
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structures (Ellinas and Lamprianou forthcoming), and its local support 
(Dinas et al. 2013; Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013). However, none of 
the existing research has examined the effects of the Golden Dawn’s rise 
on the dynamics of party competition in Greece. While the party’s 
electoral success in absolute terms may be debatable, and it has not had 
a direct effect through government participation, its rise could have 
significant policy implications. Its participation in parliamentary debates 
has the potential to shift the other parties’ programmatic agendas, both 
in terms of issue salience and in terms of party positions, thus shifting 
the nature and scope of the debate itself with regards to a number of 
policies including immigration and asylum, economic and welfare, as 
well as foreign affairs and defence.    
This paper focuses on the impact of the Golden Dawn on the dynamics 
of domestic party competition by examining whether there has been a 
change in issue salience since the party’s dramatic rise. A change in the 
salience of an issue can be crucial for policy change (Jones 1994: 5–10), 
as particular parties may place particular emphasis on specific topics, 
making them more important to the political debate (Wagner and Meyer 
2016). Our main goal is to examine the salience of topics in the Golden 
Dawn’s agenda from a comparative perspective vis-à-vis the other actors 
in the system, in order to identify whether attention on particular issues 
has shifted. We proceed with an analysis of programmatic and 
ideological materials produced by the Golden Dawn and its competitor 
parties, including election manifestos and public speeches. This allows us 
to examine whether Golden Dawn’s rise has reshaped patterns of 
competition in the Greek party system.  
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2. The far-right party family 
 
The ‘far right’ is one of the most diverse party families (Ennser 2012). 
We use the term ‘far’ as an umbrella term, which includes parties that all 
claim ownership of nationalism and national identity, and justify all 
other policies on the basis of the nation. Within this broad range of 
parties, we distinguish between ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’. While all far-
right parties are authoritarian (Dunn 2015), the extreme variants oppose 
democracy not only on substantive, but also on procedural grounds, use 
violence as a means to an end, and maintain ideological links with 
fascism (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The radical variants, on 
the other hand, distance themselves from fascism and violence, and 
often reject the far-right label altogether.  
After WWII, the extreme-right variants became increasingly irrelevant in 
Europe. One of the consequences of fascism and Nazism was the 
discrediting of the ideology of National Socialism, which meant that 
those extreme-right parties which maintained ideological and/or 
organizational links with fascism were penalised by the voters, remaining 
at the margins of the European party systems. When, from the 1980s 
onwards, far-right parties re-emerged in some European countries, they 
did so with a more moderate agenda and attempted to distance 
themselves from inter-war fascism (Ignazi 1995). While these radical 
variants maintained a key emphasis on nationalism, their ‘winning 
formula’ in the 1990s (Kitchelt with McGann 1995) was an adoption of 
neo-liberal economic policies and therefore a departure from the 
statism that characterised fascism.        
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Yet with the eruption of the Eurozone crisis in the late 2000s, the 
extreme-right phenomenon has again returned to the forefront of 
European politics. For example, other than the Golden Dawn in Greece, 
we have also witnessed the rise of the extreme-right Jobbik in Hungary, 
which increased its support dramatically in 2010 and maintained this in 
the subsequent 2014 elections; the People’s Party Our Slovakia, which 
entered the parliament in 2016 with 8.0% of the vote and 14 seats; and 
the Cypriot National Popular Front (ELAM), which entered parliament in 
2016 with 3.7% of the vote and 2 seats. This has coincided with an 
increasing electoral support for radical-right parties: for example, the 
True Finns, who received 17.6% in 2015, the French Front National 
whose support during the French regional elections reached 27.7% in 
2015, and the Swedish Democrats who received 13.0% in 2014.   
Since the late 2000s, therefore, both the extreme and radical variants of 
the far-right phenomenon have enjoyed electoral success across Europe. 
In this paper we focus on the Golden Dawn, which we define as an 
extreme variant of the far-right party family.  The party claims ownership 
of nationalism and justifies all its policies on the basis of the nation; it 
espouses the use of violence and fascist ideals. The party’s ideology goes 
beyond authoritarianism, understood as despotic rule, to the embrace of 
totalitarianism: the espousal of a system of total control by a party 
which sees itself not above the people but as the embodiment of the 
people (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The party rejects 
liberalism and socialism and endorses what it terms the 'third biggest 
ideology in history' – nationalism – combined with support for an all-
powerful state premised on 'popular sovereignty'. It shares with other 
fascist movements both a fixation on societal degeneration and the 
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proposed solution, which encompasses the necessity for national rebirth 
through a collective movement from below, understood as embodied by 
the Golden Dawn and its leader (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).  
2.1  The effect of the far-right: Immigration 
 What is the effect of the rise of the far-right party on party competition 
and issue prioritization? And why is this important? Theories of party 
competition postulate that fringe parties may influence mainstream 
parties, both in terms of policy positions and issue salience (Meguid 
2005; Van Spanje 2010). In terms of policy positions, successful rhetoric 
entails imitation: most of the literature expects that a contagion effect 
takes place when a far-right party enters the system (e.g. Van Spanje 
2010). In the Downsian framework parties which are understood as 
suppliers in an electoral market model are expected to shift their 
positions in order to meet popular demand (Downs 1957). As a response 
to the electoral threat posed by far-right parties, centrist parties of both 
the left and the right are likely to readjust their position on key issues 
such as immigration, in order to compete for support (Wagner and 
Meyer 2016).  
In terms of issue salience, the growth of far-right parties entails that 
mainstream parties may no longer side-line issues that are integral to 
far-right party ideology. Issue salience is important because it can 
change the nature of the debate, shifting the emphasis on what is 
actually discussed. Mainstream parties may either take an 
‘accommodative’ or an ‘adversarial’ stance, but either position increases 
the salience of issues that the far right deems important (Meguid 2008).  
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Here, we are concerned with issue salience because we want to identify 
whether the issues on which the Golden Dawn centres its agenda have 
become more prominent in the political debate. Our starting point is 
immigration. This is because a large body of literature identifies 
immigration as an issue owned by the far right (e.g. Van Spanje 2010). 
There is consensus that since immigration is the key issue associated 
with the far right, the entry of far-right parties in the system will first and 
foremost influence the salience of immigration and hence, there is 
extensive research on the impact of far-right party success on 
immigration (Bale 2003; Ivarsflaten 2008; Van Spanje 2010; Alonso & 
Claro da Fonseca 2011; Immerzeel et al. 2015). From this we hypothesise 
that: 
H1: The rise of the Golden Dawn is likely to be associated with an 
increase in the salience of immigration across the party system.     
2.2  The broader effect of the far-right: Nationalism 
So far we have identified the potential effect of the rise of the far right 
on the importance of immigration policy in party programmatic agendas. 
However, in our definition of the far-right party family, these parties are 
not single-issue parties, but rather, their programmatic agendas propose 
reforms on a variety of issues, where they offer ‘nationalist’ solutions 
(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). This entails that nationalism is 
the key to understanding the far right, and hence its impact on party 
competition, and this need not necessarily be confined to immigration 
policy.  
Differences between the extreme and the radical variants of the far right 
notwithstanding, nationalism is the core ideological characteristic of all 
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far-right parties, which idealise the nation (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). 
Nationalism may be understood as an ideological / political movement 
seeking the attainment and maintenance of unity, autonomy and 
identity of a deemed nation (Breuilly 2005). The core doctrine of 
nationalism emphasises the ultimate value of national self-
determination. It assumes that the world consists of sovereign, 
individual and distinct nations with their own history and culture. 
Because the nation is the ultimate source of sovereignty, loyalty to it 
must override other loyalties. Self-determination is the ultimate goal; 
every nation’s aspiration is to be free and secure. The nation is fully 
justified to pursue its self-determination, even if this should require 
violent means (Smith 1991).  
Ensuring that national identity stays homogenous and unaltered is 
pivotal in ensuring that the nation will remain free and secure. As such, 
far-right parties focus on nationalism as a way of politicising the issue of 
identity (Hainsworth 2008). From this we might expect that the effect on 
party competition may not only be confined to a specific policy, but 
rather the extent to which nationalism is used as the master narrative to 
frame other key policy issues. From this we hypothesis that: 
H2: The rise of the Golden Dawn is likely to be associated with an 
increase in the salience of nationalism across the party system. 
2.3  The different effect of the far right: Ethnic and civic nationalism 
So far we have identified the importance of nationalism as a master 
framework. However, nationalism is not necessarily a uniform ideology. 
The criteria for defining national membership vary in terms of their 
degree of inclusivity. Existing theories of nationalism address this 
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question of national inclusivity in terms of the ethnic-civic divide (Smith 
1991). These theories often emphasise the Janus character of 
nationalism, by distinguishing between exclusive (ascriptive) and 
inclusive (institutional) criteria of national membership (Kohn 1946; 
Nairn 1975; Smith 1991; Hechter 2000). While ethnic ties are based on a 
sense of self-identity determined by ‘natural’ factors such as language or 
ethnic descent, civic ties are based on deliberate human commitment 
(Zimmer 2003).  
The exclusive criteria may be described as ethno-cultural. We break 
them down in two categories: 
1. Ethnic: this refers to ascriptive criteria such as language, religion 
race and/or ancestry.  
2. Cultural: this refers to the reproduction of the pattern of values 
that constitutes a nation, including the preservation of traditional values 
and the national way of life.  
The inclusive criteria are voluntaristic and legal-institutional, based on a 
community of law, the provision of rights and the democratic ideal of 
popular sovereignty. We break them down in two categories: 
3. Territorial: this refers to national self-determination and the 
identification of the nation with a specific and predefined territory.  
4. Economic: this refers to the existence of a common economy and 
currency.   
This entails that parties of different ideological predispositions may draw 
upon different elements of nationalism, and therefore emphasise the 
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different categories of the nationalism master framework. The question 
then arises: which category of nationalism is more likely to be 
emphasised by which party family? The right appears the more 
straightforward answer, as nationalism tends to be associated with right-
wing parties. This is both because of right-wing parties’ emphasis on 
socially and culturally conservative values, including cultural unity and 
national pride (Van Spagne 2010), as well as their stricter stance on 
immigration (Alonso & Claro da Fonseca 2011). Right-wing parties have a 
‘tradition of defending the nation and its culture from external threats’ 
(Bale 2008: 463), meaning that they have an additional incentive to 
accommodate far-right stances on nationalism, not least because they 
see themselves as direct competitors (Van Spagne 2010). From this we 
expect that all elements of nationalism that focus on ethno-cultural 
criteria are more likely to be accommodated by right-wing parties: 
H3: The proportion of references to ethnic and cultural nationalism is 
likely to increase among right-wing parties. 
The relationship between nationalism and the left is less 
straightforward. At first glance there appears to be an incompatibility 
between the two, primarily because key left-wing values tend to be 
associated with internationalism. For left-wing parties, the key societal 
cleavage is class rather than culture, ethnicity or national identity. 
However, research has shown that nationalism and the left can be 
compatible under certain circumstances (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 
2011; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). The connection becomes possible when 
the left equates the nation with class and popular sovereignty 
(Schwartzmantel 1987; Yak 2001; Erk 2010). The nation is defined as a 
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democratic community bound by geographical borders in ‘which all 
citizens can participate in exercising their democratic rights and in that 
way shape their own destiny’ (Schwartzmantel 1987: 242). Therefore, 
the left is drawn to a voluntaristic type of nationalism, as opposed to a 
cultural one, emphasising civic criteria of national membership and 
popular sovereignty.  
Hence, the immigration question is a challenge for the left. On the one 
hand, many of the arguments on immigration are based on an ethno-
cultural understanding of the nation. On the other hand, far-right parties 
with anti-immigrant agendas are successful in drawing votes from left-
wing constituencies premised on an argument of immigration as 
competition for welfare. For example, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party’s voting base has been described as including left-
behind, former Labour voters (Ford and Goodwin 2014). This anti-
immigration rhetoric has a civic component, as the basis of exclusion is 
not ethno-cultural per se, but actually the right to access the collective 
goods of the state. In order to compete for these voters, the left is likely 
to adapt to the nationalism question but because of ideological 
limitations–-due to the rejection of non-materialist cleavage, ethnic 
nationalism is not a viable option–-it is more likely to adapt to civic 
nationalism, focusing on institutions, sovereignty and territory. 
Therefore we hypothesise the following: 
H4: The proportion of references to territorial and economic nationalism 
is likely to increase among left-wing parties.   
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3. Data 
 
This paper investigates the programmatic agenda of the Golden Dawn 
and the effect of the party’s rise on issue salience as reflected in parties’ 
discursive priorities and legislative debates. We analyse party-specific 
materials, which capture the ideological and programmatic agenda of 
the Golden Dawn and other parties in the Greek party system. These 
include two types of sources:  
(1) Election manifestos issued by the political parties. These are official 
statements that signal to citizens on which issues a party is focusing its 
attention. We have selected to code party manifestos in five separate 
elections: 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 20153. We do this in order to 
capture potential change across time. Our sample also includes the 
radical right LAOS in order to generate a comprehensive picture of the 
Greek party system since the early 2000s. Hence we have one election 
year without a far-right gaining parliamentary representation (2004), 
two election years when the radical-right LAOS was granted 
representation (2007 and 2009) and two electoral years when the 
extreme-right Golden Dawn achieved representation in the Greek 
Parliament (2012 and 2015). This includes a total of ten parties and 
thirty-three manifestos. More specifically, for 2004 and 2007, this 
includes five parties: the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK), the centre-right New Democracy (ND), the far-left Coalition of 
Left and Progress (SYN), the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the far-
right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). For 2009, the Coalition of the 
                                                 
3 There were two national elections in 2012 and 2015. However, as the manifestos were the same at 
both elections, they were coded only once. 
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Radical Left (SYRIZA) replaces SYN. The other four parties remain the 
same as in previous years. In 2012 the crisis resulted in the 
fragmentation of the party system and thus an increase in the number of 
parties competing for parliamentary representation (Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou 2013). For this year we examine a total of eight parties, 
which, in addition to the five mentioned above, include the extreme-
right Golden Dawn, the radical-right splinter party from ND Independent 
Greeks (ANEL), and the centre-left Democratic Left (DIMAR). In 2015, we 
expand the analysis to include two additional parties: the centrist RIVER 
and the centre-left Movement of Democratic Socialists (KINIMA) (see 
Table 1).  
Political Party  2015 2012 2009 2007 2004 
SYRIZA/SYN           
PASOK           
ND           
LAOS           
ΚΚΕ           
GD        
DIMAR        
ANEL        
POTAMI       
KINIMA         
Table 1: Manifestos coded per election year. 
(2) Public speeches in the national parliament: In addition to electoral 
manifestos, which provide us with ‘snap-shots’ of party behaviour, we 
examine the continuous presence of parties between elections through 
an analysis of their speeches. Looking at speeches allows us to directly 
examine the context of the crisis. We have thus identified four critical 
legislative junctures with significant consequences in terms of policy-
making and implementation of reform during the Greek sovereign debt 
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crisis. These include party leader speeches during the signing of the 
three Memorandums of Understanding (2010, 2012 and 2015), as well 
as during the July 2015 Referendum on whether to accept the bailout 
conditions proposed jointly by the European Commission (EC), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
in June 2015. 
Party leaders’ reactions during these critical junctures allow us to 
measure the importance that they placed on specific issues. We 
compare two critical junctures (Memorandum I and Memorandum II) 
during which the Golden Dawn was not in the legislature, and two 
junctures (Memorandum III and Referendum) during which they were, 
thus allowing us to capture the extent to which there is a shift in the 
debate driven by the Golden Dawn in the legislature. For Memorandums 
I and II, we examined the speeches of five party leaders: Karatzaferis 
(LAOS), Papandreou (PASOK), Papariga (KKE), Samaras (ND) and Tsipras 
(SYRIZA). For Memorandum III, we examined the speeches of seven 
party leaders: including Gennimata (PASOK), Kammenos (ANEL), 
Koutsoumpas (KKE), Meimerakis (ND), Michaloliakos (Golden Dawn), 
Theodorakis (RIVER) and Tsipras (SYRIZA). For the debate on the 2015 
referendum, we examined Gennimata (PASOK), Kammenos (ANEL), 
Koutsoumpas (KKE), Michaloliakos (Golden Dawn), Samaras (New 
Democracy), Theodorakis (RIVER) and Tsipras (SYRIZA). This is a total of 
twenty-four speeches (see Table 2). 
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Party leader Memorandum 
I 
Memorandum 
II 
Memorandum 
III 
Referendum 
2015 
Karatzaferis       
Papandreou       
Papariga       
Samaras        
Tsipras         
Gennimata       
Kammenos       
Koutsoumpas       
Meimarakis      
Michaloliakos       
Theodorakis       
Table 2: Speeches coded per critical juncture. 
 
4.  Methods 
 
We analyse these documents through the employment of a 
comprehensive framework for coding policy agendas provided by the 
Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)4.  The CAP aims to create a series of 
commonly coded databases, which focus on the policy content of 
political parties. The CAP project provides standardised data, which are 
comparable across countries and applied consistently over time (Bevan 
2014). The CAP framework includes 19 major topic codes: 
macroeconomics; civil rights, minority issues, immigration and civil 
liberties; health; agriculture; labour and employment; education; 
environment; energy; transportation; law, crime and family issues; social 
welfare; community development, planning and housing issues; banking, 
finance and domestic commerce; defence; space, science, technology 
and communications; foreign trade; international affairs and foreign aid; 
                                                 
4 http://www.comparativeagendas.info/ 
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government operations; and public lands, water management and 
colonial and territorial issues. Each code also includes a range of sub-
topics. For example the macroeconomics category comprises the 
following sub-categories: general domestic macroeconomic issues; 
inflation, prices, and interest rates; unemployment rate; monetary 
supply, central bank, and the treasury; national budget and debt; 
taxation, tax policy and tax reform; industrial policy; and price control 
(for the Greek version of CAP, see Appendix 1 Greek codebook). These 
can be used to reliably compare issue attention longitudinally, across 
decision-making venues, and between nations. In terms of technique, 
the primary purpose is to identify an argument. This is done by breaking 
down sentences to their shortest form: the quasi-sentence, which 
contains a subject, a verb and an attribute. Long sentences are broken 
down into quasi-sentences for the purposes of coding. 
4.1  Nationalism 
We add a new ‘nationalism’ category to the CAP coding. Given that we 
have identified nationalism as key to the programmatic agenda of the far 
right, we coded whether each policy issue was framed in terms of 
nationalism. We coded nationalism for each quasi-sentence. Those 
sentences that were coded as nationalistic were further coded into the 
sub-categories of nationalism identified above (ethnic, cultural, 
territorial and economic). The rationale for our coding scheme is as 
follows: 
1. Ethnic: the portrayal of the Greek nation as a perennial and un-
eroded community of descent, bound by ethnic and biological 
identifiers.  
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2. Cultural: an emphasis on the preservation of a traditional way of 
life and support for customs and cultural traditions including religion.  
3. Territorial: understanding the Greek nation as a geographical 
entity whose members are bound by a pre-defined territory and its 
borders. The emphasis here is on the defence of self-determination and 
the importance of borders for the continued existence of the Greek 
nation.   
4. Economic: this has two dimensions. First, the symbolic importance 
of the national currency – this includes references to the drachma and 
the euro. Second, the broader question of who governs the national 
economy, which is a question of sovereignty.     
5. Findings 
 
Our first step is to identify the most salient issues in the Golden Dawn’s 
manifestos and see how these may have changed from 2012 to 2015. 
From our coding of the party’s two manifestos, we make the following 
observations. First, there are quite a few policy issues, as identified by 
the CAP framework, that the party chooses not to address. These include 
the environment, transportation, planning and housing, technology, and 
foreign trade in both elections, as well as labour and employment in 
2015. Second, the party focuses on three key issues in both years. These 
include government, defence and macroeconomics. While these three 
issues are prominent in the party’s manifestos, the sequence of their 
importance is different. In 2012, 11.0% of the party’s manifesto focuses 
on macroeconomics, as opposed to 16.3% in 2015. Similarly, while 22.2% 
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of the 2012 manifesto focuses on issues related to government, in 2015 
this drops to 15.0%. While in 2012 defence was the second most 
important issue with 14.7% attention, in 2015 it dropped to the third 
place with 10.9%. Third, interestingly immigration has little coverage and 
does not constitute one of the top three salient issues for the Golden 
Dawn. In 2012 immigration amounted to 9.0% of the party’s manifesto, 
and in 2015 to only 6.0%. See Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relative issue salience in Golden Dawn’s manifestos (2012 and 2015) 
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However, it is important to raise two issues here. First, in the CAP 
scheme, coverage of an issue refers directly to policy content. This 
means that an issue may be raised, but if it does not contain policy 
content – a substantive focus on a specific policy and / or direct policy 
recommendations – then it is not coded. As a result, while a Golden 
Dawn manifesto may have numerous references to immigration, unless 
it is linked directly to a specific policy recommendation, the issue is not 
coded. Second, relatively low issue salience does not necessarily affect 
party position. The Golden Dawn may not discuss the question of 
immigration as frequently as other topics in terms of specific policy 
recommendations, but its position on the issue remains fervently 
against. Our qualitative analysis of the party’s manifestos reveals that 
when immigration is mentioned, the references are clearly anti-
immigrant. The party distinguishes between Greeks and foreigners, 
irrespective of whether those foreigners may have Greek citizenship, 
and takes issue with the concept of ‘legal immigration’. Illegal 
immigrants are portrayed as invaders and an ‘alien body’ in Greek 
society. According to the 2015 manifesto, each foreign worker amounts 
to an unemployed Greek person. The deportation of all illegal 
immigrants will result in the opening of thousands of jobs for Greek 
people’ (Golden Dawn 2015).     
Has the rise of the Golden Dawn influenced the salience of immigration? 
We have hypothesised above that given the far right’s ownership of the 
immigration issue, the salience of immigration is likely to have increased 
across the party system. We test this hypothesis by examining the 
relative change of the three most important issues in party manifestos 
from 2004 to 2015. Table 3 identifies the three most salient issues for 
  19 
each party in each of the five electoral years. It shows that the policy of 
immigration and minority issues has little salience both before and after 
the Golden Dawn’s rise. Instead, from 2012 onwards, the issues of 
government, macroeconomics, banking and finance, defence, labour and 
employment and international affairs are the most salient issues across 
the party system. Given the context of the severe economic crisis that 
altered political opportunity structures in the first place, it is expected 
that the issues related to the economy and governance would be the 
most salient in parties’ agendas. 
2004 1 2 3 
PASOK Government Banking & Finance Education 
ND Education Health Government 
KKE Government Macroeconomics International 
LAOS Government Law & Crime Health 
SYN Government Civil Liberties Macroeconomics 
2007 1 2 3 
PASOK Government Education Banking & Finance 
ND Banking & Finance Law & Crime Government 
KKE 
Government 
Labour & 
Employment 
Education 
LAOS Government Education Macroeconomics 
SYN 
Government 
Labour & 
Employment 
Civil Liberties 
2009 1 2 3 
PASOK Government Education Banking & Finance 
ND 
Labour & 
Employment 
Transportation Energy 
KKE 
Labour & 
Employment 
Government Macroeconomics 
LAOS Macroeconomics Government Law & Crime 
SYRIZA Environment Macroeconomics Government 
2012 1 2 3 
PASOK Macroeconomics Government Banking & Finance 
ND 
Labour & 
Employment 
Government Transportation 
KKE Government International Macroeconomics 
LAOS Macroeconomics Government Defence 
SYRIZA 
Macroeconomics Government 
Labour & 
Employment 
GD Government Defence Macroeconomics 
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DIMAR Macroeconomics Government International 
ANEL Macroeconomics Government International 
2015 1 2 3 
PASOK Macroeconomics Banking & Finance Government 
ND 
Macroeconomics 
Labour & 
Employment 
Government 
KKE 
Government 
Labour & 
Employment 
Macroeconomics 
LAOS Banking & Finance Macroeconomics International 
SYRIZA Government Macroeconomics Banking & Finance 
GD Macroeconomics Government Defence 
DIMAR Macroeconomics Government Banking & Finance 
ANEL Education Government Banking & Finance 
POTAMI Government Education Civil Liberties 
KIDISO Macroeconomics Government Law & Crime 
Table 3: Most important issues per party per election year. 
Figure 2 below, which focuses on the issue of minority rights and 
immigration, shows how attention to this issue has changed over time 
for each of the parties. One overall observation is that there is no 
consistent pattern of change in the salience of immigration and minority 
rights across the party system. Certain parties have politicized the issue 
of immigration more than others – although this picture does not show 
whether their stance is one of accommodation or polarization. On the 
one hand, the two mainstream parties, PASOK and ND, appear to pay 
relatively less attention to immigration. Both focus more on the issue in 
2007 and 2009, while attention levels decline in 2012. PASOK pays 
slightly more attention to immigration in 2015 compared to ND. On the 
other hand, LAOS, the River, the Golden Dawn, SYN/SYRIZA and DIMAR 
pay more attention to immigration. Surprisingly ANEL, which is another 
far-right party, does not mention the issue much. These findings partially 
confirm Hypothesis 1. The River and DIMAR are the only two parties that 
address the issue of minority rights and immigration in their manifestos 
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substantially. This is consistent with party competition explanations that 
see centrist parties as competing on issues relating to civil liberties.    
 
 
Figure 2: Attention to minority rights and immigration per political party. 
 
5.1  Nationalism 
Because nationalism forms a fundamental part of the programmatic 
agenda of the far right, we expect that the rise of the Golden Dawn will 
be associated with an increase in the salience of nationalism across the 
Greek political spectrum. We start by examining the presence of 
nationalism in the Golden Dawn’s manifestos. Figures 3 and 4 below 
show the proportion of nationalist references per policy issue. We find 
nationalism is present among most issues. In accordance with research 
that identifies immigration and defence as key policy areas of the far-
right agenda (e.g. Hainsworth 2008), we find that these two issues have 
the highest proportion of nationalist references in Golden Dawn’s 
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manifestos. Also, a high proportion of nationalist references may be 
observed in the party’s discussion of international affairs, foreign trade, 
education and culture, agriculture, banking and finance. We also observe 
a significant increase in nationalist references in 2015 compared to 2012 
in the issues of health, public lands and territorial issues and energy. 
 
 
Figure 3: Nationalism per issue in the 2012 Golden Dawn Manifesto. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Nationalism per issue in the 2015 Golden Dawn Manifesto. 
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We proceed by examining the presence of nationalism across the party 
system. Figure 5 below measures the proportion of overall nationalist 
references in party manifestos in the five election years. It also shows 
the proportion of references to each separate category of nationalism. 
The figure illustrates that nationalist references overall had a significant 
increase from 2009. This was sustained in 2012 and dropped slightly in 
2015. The proportion of references to nationalism is much higher in 
2012 and 2015 compared to 2004 and 2007. The greater amount of 
nationalist references may be observed in the category of economic 
nationalism. In 2012, the proportion of references to ethnic and cultural 
nationalism has increased slightly compared to 2009. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of nationalist references in party manifestos per election year, 
overall and in subcategories. 
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We proceed to test the extent to which the proportion of nationalist 
references have increased in particular issues. Our interest is in two 
specific policy areas – macroeconomics and government – because these 
issues have been of high salience across the political system since the 
eruption of the crisis. Our rationale is to determine whether the way in 
which political parties portray these issues has become more 
nationalistic. Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate both attention to the 
specific issue and the proportion of nationalist references. Figure 6, 
examining the issue of macroeconomics, shows that the proportion of 
nationalist references increased across time. In 2004 and 2007, political 
parties paid less attention to the issue of macroeconomics compared to 
2009, 2012 and 2015. This attention contains relatively fewer nationalist 
references. The KKE 2007 manifesto is an exception. The party makes 
the most nationalist references during that electoral year compared to 
the other parties. In 2009 nationalist references made by most parties 
increased. This trend is broadly sustained in 2012 and 2015 with some 
fluctuations. The references to nationalism in LAOS’s 2009 manifesto 
increased dramatically compared to 2004 and 2007. In 2012 and 2015 
nationalist references declined; however, they remained higher 
compared to 2004 and 2007. This can be explained by the party’s 
participation in the pro-Memorandum coalition government. In 2015 
nationalist references made by KKE, PASOK and SYRIZA increased 
compared to 2004 and 2007, while DIMAR and ND remained broadly 
stable.  
Similar trends are observed in Figure 7, which focuses on the issue of 
government. Nationalist references increase from 2009 onwards with 
LAOS, SYRIZA, KKE and ANEL making the most nationalistic references. 
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DIMAR, PASOK and ND contain the fewest. These findings provide 
support for Hypothesis 2. There are, however, differences between the 
different parties. 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of nationalist references per issue per year: Macroeconomics. 
 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of nationalist references per issue per year: Government. 
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In addition to our overall nationalism hypothesis, we have also tested a 
series of assumption with regards to the relationship types of 
nationalism and particular political parties. Our hypotheses here are that 
ethnic nationalism is more likely to increase among right-leaning parties, 
whereas civic nationalism is more likely to increase among left-leaning 
parties. In Figures 8 and 9, we measure references to ethnic nationalism 
by merging the ethnic and cultural nationalism categories, and 
references to civic nationalism by merging the territorial and economic 
nationalism categories.  
Figure 8, which examines party manifestos, shows an overall prevalence 
of references to civic nationalism among most political parties. 
Consistent with our expectations from the literature (Halikiopoulou et al. 
2012), the far right LAOS, ANEL and Golden Dawn have the highest 
proportion of ethnic nationalist statements. In addition, the proportion 
of their civic nationalism is also high. Among far-left parties, the 
proportion of references to ethnic nationalism is low. However, 
references to civic nationalism are relatively high in KKE manifestos. The 
proportion of SYRIZA’s references to nationalism is high, but notably 
declined since the party entered government, which is to be expected in 
its shift from a party of opposition, to a party of government. 
Surprisingly, we observe higher than expected levels of both ethnic and 
civic nationalism in the mainstream PASOK and the centrist KIDISO 
manifestos. These findings support Hypothesis 3, illustrating that ethnic 
nationalist references are predominant among right-leaning parties. 
They partly support Hypothesis 4, in that the proportion of references to 
civic nationalism is high among left-leaning parties, but they are high 
among the other parties as well.  
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Figure 8: References to ethnic and civic nationalism in Greek party manifests (2004, 
2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015). 
 
 
Figure 9: References to ethnic and civic nationalism in Greek party leader speeches 
(Memorandum I 2010, Memorandum II 2012, Memorandum III 2015 and 
Referendum 2015). 
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Figure 9, which focuses on party leader speeches during the four critical 
junctures, reveals a similar picture. As expected, the far-right LAOS, 
ANEL, and Golden Dawn have a high proportion of references to both 
ethnic and civic nationalism. KKE and SYRIZA have a high proportion of 
references to civic nationalism. An interesting finding is that during the 
first Memorandum in 2010, Tsipras’ speech includes an equal proportion 
of references to ethnic and civic nationalism, which both decline in 
subsequent years. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the impact of the Golden Dawn on the 
dynamics of domestic party competition in Greece by focusing on issue 
salience. Using the Comparative Agenda Project’s coding scheme, we 
have examined two sets of sources - party election manifestos and 
leaders’ speeches. We did so in order to capture changes in issue 
salience, as reflected in parties’ discursive priorities and legislative 
debates, across time. In addition to coding policy issues identified in the 
CAP framework, we added a nationalism category to the Greek 
codebook, seeking to capture the extent to which nationalist references 
frame each policy issue. In order to determine whether particular types 
of nationalism are associated with the agendas of specific parties, we 
have distinguished between four nationalism categories (ethnic, cultural, 
territorial and economic), merging them into two broad types in 
accordance with the existing literature (Smith 1991).  
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Our findings indicate that the three most salient issues in the Golden 
Dawn’s manifesto are macroeconomics, defence and government. The 
salience of minority issues and immigration is lower than these three 
policy areas, and much lower than expected. This may be explained by 
the rise of the Golden Dawn coinciding with the economic crisis, 
meaning that an increased emphasis on issues such as the economy and 
governance is to be expected. There is no indication that there is a clear 
link between the rise of the Golden Dawn and the salience of the 
immigration issue in the programmatic agendas of other parties.  
Our data indicate that the Golden Dawn’s framing of policy issues is 
highly nationalistic. We also observe a high proportion of nationalist 
references across the party system. However, there is no clear 
discernible pattern; nor a clear indication that the Golden Dawn’s rise 
has driven this increase in references to nationalism. Lastly we tested 
whether specific types of nationalism are more prevalent among 
particular political parties. Here our findings confirm that that the ethnic 
component of nationalism is more prevalent among right-leaning 
parties. The civic component of nationalism is widespread both among 
left-leaning parties and other parties in the system.  
Our contribution is both theoretical and empirical. In terms of theory, 
we contribute to the literature that examines the impact of the far right 
on the programmatic agendas of other parties in the system. In addition, 
we theorise the impact of the far right in terms of nationalism, which is 
core to the far right’s ideology but remains understudied.  In terms of 
our empirical contribution, we advance scholarly knowledge on the 
ideological profile and programmatic agenda of the Golden Dawn by 
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coding source materials. We also examined its impact on the Greek 
political system by coding the materials of other parties and assessing 
the extent to which there has been a change in the issue prioritization of 
these parties’ agendas. Finally, we produce data that can enable 
researchers to directly compare the ideological and programmatic 
content of the Golden Dawn with that of other far-right parties in 
Europe. 
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